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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER
at the decade of the 2000s, particularly during the
financial crisis, one might detect an ebbing of the
NGO role and the claims for its significance as
RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON NGOs
compared to the 1990s. No example comes to
NGOs in InternationalLaw: Efficiency in Flexibil- mind in recent years of a hugely successful NGO
ity? Edited by Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa international campaign or a new technique of
Vierucci. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton,
NGO persuasion.
MA: Edward Elgar, 2008. Pp. vii, 281. Index.
If NGO innovation and activism has slowed,
$140, £75.
the same is not true of scholarship about nonstate
actors, and especially NGOs. In the past couple of
Global Stakeholder Democracy: Power and Repreyears, several important studies have been pubsentation Beyond LiberalStates. By Terry Maclished on aspects of the topic of international law/
donald. Oxford, New York: Oxford University
governance and NGOs. In this review, I take note
Press, 2008. Pp. x, 237. Index. $90, £45.
of five new books, including three edited volumes.
NGO Involvement in InternationalOrganizations: One book styles itself as theoretical, whereas the
others have mixed methodologies, including some
A LegalAnalysis. By Sergey Ripinsky and Peter
van den Bossche. London: British Institute of fruitful empirical work.
Several questions preoccupy contemporary
International and Comparative Law, 2007. Pp.
scholars
on NGOs: First, has international law
xv, 362. £65, paper.
been updated to accommodate a new legal status
Civil Society Participationin European and Global for NGOs, giving them international legal personGovernance: A Cure fbr the Democratic Deficit? ality? Second, are international organizations
Edited by Jens Steffek, Claudia Kissling, and (1Os) rendered more legitimate by extending a
Patrizia Nanz. Basingstroke, Eng.: Palgrave Mac- consultative role to NGOs? Or, in other words,
millan, 2008. Pp. xvii, 244. Index. $80.00, £55.
can NGOs make amends for the so-called demoNGO Involvement in International Governance cratic deficit of IOs? Third, how can NGOs be
made accountable for the tasks that they perform,
and Policy: Sources of Legitimacy. Edited by
Anton Vedder. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, and to whom is such accountability owed? Fourth,
in particular cases, how has the NGO role changed
2007. Pp. xi, 234. Index. $119, E84.00.
outcomes with respect to treaty content, impleA dozen years ago, I advanced the hypothesis mentation, or enforcement? One or more of these
that the degree of involvement and impact of non- questions receives attention in each of the new
2
governmental organizations (NGOs) in interna- books reviewed here.
Edited by Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa Viertional lawmaking exhibits a pattern of cyclicality,
with surges and ebbs of influence.' Looking back ucci, NGOs in InternationalLaw is a volume of
REVIEW ESSAYS

2 This review does not cover the discussion-in sevI Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation:
eral chapters in the different books-regarding the
NGOsandInternationalGovernance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L
NGO role in European institutions.
L. 183, 268-70 (1997).
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essays that builds upon a workshop about NGOs
held at the European University Institute in 2002.
Several themes are developed in the book. In the
introductory essay, Vierucci and Christine Bakker
explain that there is a "recurrent dilemma haunting modern international law: on the one hand,
the perceived benefits of regulating an existing and
progressing practice of NGO involvement in the
international legal order; and, on the other hand
the perceived risks oflegalizing the participation of
these non-state actors in the traditional state-dominated system" (p. 7). Yet as they explore the many
issues, the book's contributors find that there are
serious challenges in achieving new international
regulation of NGOs. The problem is that formalization is hard to achieve because of the wide variety ofNGOs and the myriad ways that NGOs participate in international processes. In addition, the
book shows that this informality has proven valuable to NGOs, governments, and 1Os. Nevertheless, the continuing operation of NGOs in a "legal
vacuum" has its own costs: the continuing uncertainty as to when and how NGOs have rights and
obligations, and as to how an NGO can be held
internationally accountable for its actions.
In his conclusion to the volume, Dupuy creatively explores the "difficulties that the rapid
development of NGOs has created for legal scholarship" (p. 207), both with respect to legal doctrine and the "increasing and progressive widening
of the gap between the declared status of NGOs
and their actual power of participation" (p. 212).
Noting that NGOs have "become indispensable
to the efficiency of the more or less rigid structures
of international organizations" (p. 205) and that
"t] here is currently an increasing awareness on the
part of the international judge of the fruitful contribution that NGOs may bring to international
proceedings" (p. 210), Dupuy posits that "the
only way for legal scholars to apprehend the reality
of the NGOs' involvement is to go beyond the
rigid inter-state and voluntarist conceptions usually put forward by the positivist school of
thought" (p. 214). He predicts that the largest and
most involved NGOs may eventually "be granted
some form of legal personality" (p. 210). Yet he
also suggests that the "question of the international legal personality of NGOs might not neces-
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sarily be the right one" (p. 213) because in increasing legal certainty, NGOs would "risk losing
flexibility" (id.). Dupuy sees the flexibility of
NGO international involvement as efficient for
NGOs, states, and 1Os. He suggests that scholars
should focus less on the legal status of NGOs and
more on whether NGOs are "an effective and
legitimate power to have a say on the content of
international norms" (p. 215). Furthermore, he
calls for NGOs to "satisfy a requirement of transparency" and to "accept the necessary minimum
control over the gathering and verification of the
information provided" (p. 213).
The longest essay in the book, by Emanuele
Rebasti, recounts how the interaction between
NGOs and 1Os has deepened, with NGOs now
perceived as being in "partnership" with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), rather than
being mere observers or simply in "consultative
status." Indeed, he posits that "non-governmental
participation is strongly emerging as a parameter
of good governance for IGOs" (p. 23), and notes
that attempts by states to reduce NGO participatory rights "regularly meet fierce opposition from
other member states which justify the defence of
NGOs' prerogatives with the need to preserve the
effectiveness of intergovernmental action" (p. 67).
Furthermore, he suggests that the NGO role can
"strengthen the accountability of international
organizations by compensating for the lack ofprocedural rules and review mechanisms of IGOs'
action" (pp. 6 9-70). But this enhanced NGO role
leads to a greater need for regulation "in the selection of civil society interlocutors, in the definition
of the modalities of interaction and in the supervision of NGO activity" (p. 43). With regard to
the latter, Rebasti sees "an emerging trend to
include mechanisms of self-regulation in formal
participatory schemes" (p. 64).
Olivier de Frouville contributes a fine essay
exploring the phenomenon of government-oriented NGOs-which he calls "servile society" (p.
72). In contrast to civil society serving a public
interest, servile society serves a state interest. Such
NGOs are hardly new, but his essay documents an
increasing sponsorship of such NGOs in international forums by China, Cuba, Tunisia, and other
states. As de Frouville explains, servile society was
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ushered in back in 1996 when the UN Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) changed its longtime rules so as to be more open to the participation of national-level NGOs. This essay provides
an overview of the practices of ECOSOC's intergovernmental committee on NGOs-practices
that, he says, result "in the admission of servile
NGOs and the exclusion of independent ones" (p.
82). The committee's review processes can be used
to try to intimidate NGOs "considered too critical" (p. 92) of affected states by threatening to
have their UN status suspended or withdrawn.
Indeed, de Frouville worries that "all the reform
processes that were started in recent years at the
United Nations resulted in a decrease in the rights
of NGOs without compensation elsewhere, such
as in the level of participation" (p. 11). The
author is doubtful that the committee can perform
more effectively "as long as this organ remains
purely intergovernmental" (pp. 113-14). Instead,
he suggests that the committee should be reconstituted with independent experts or a mix of such
experts and NGOs.
In her essay on international courts and tribunals, Vierucci uses a comparative approach to
illustrate the many modalities of NGO involvement at both international and regional levels.
With respect to the direct standing of NGOs, she
points to some important recent developments
but finds that the "primary avenues of NGOs for
legal enforcement are still domestic tribunals" (p.
160). With respect to indirect participation by
NGOs as amici curiae, she sees a potential for
NGOs to "give a terrific contribution to the law"
(p. 166) and envisions the possibility of a "determination of the leave to file amicus briefs as a matter of customary law" (p. 174). Yet she also
expresses a concern that amicus briefs "may
increasingly shift towards representation of either
party interest or a direct legal interest of the intervener itself" (p. 164 n.32). Looking ahead, she
argues that "a more formalized legal status for
NGOs' participation, be it direct or indirect, in
international adjudication seems unavoidable in
order to address the tension between the differing
interests at stake" (p. 169), particularly to protect
the rights of the parties. She calls for an intervening
NGO to clearly state its interest in a proceeding.

Two essays in the book address the NGO role in
international environmental lawmaking. Attila
Tanzi surveys the variety of practices of NGO
involvement and finds that much of that involvement is ad hoc. He concludes that both states and
NGOs "seem to have, for opposite reasons, a
strong interest in avoiding the formalization of a
regulatory framework for public participation" (p.
151). Cesare Pitea examines the participation by
NGOs in noncompliance procedures such as in
the Aarhus Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Ozone. He finds that while NGO involvement has led to "furthering the effectiveness of the
compliance review action," governments have not
wanted to allow NGOs to initiate noncompliance
procedures as that "may undermine the non-confrontational functioning of those procedures and
bear negatively on their efficiency" (p. 199).
A final observation about NGOs in InternationalLaw is that the book lacks a good index but
does contain a bibliography and some useful documents in appendices.
In Global Stakeholder Democracy, Terry Macdonald, a political theorist teaching at Monash
University, proposes a framework (or model) for
conceptualizing whether public power is exercised
democratically over populations beyond the territorial boundaries of states. While noting that her
model would also be applicable to states, lOs, and
transnational corporations, Macdonald focuses
her book on NGOs. She does so in order to
respond to the debate about "the democratic
dilemmas surrounding the power of NGOs in
contemporary world politics" and also because
NGOs provide a lens "to rethink some standard
state-centric assumptions about the fundamental
elements of a democratic system" (p. 6). She suggests that her model can help NGOs "build stronger democratic credentials as representatives of
various stakeholder groups" (p. 15).
A key intellectual move in the book is to ask the
reader to forgo the assumption that democracy
needs to occur within a closed society having a unified agent of public power and a discrete community of citizens. Instead, Macdonald postulates a
pluralist global liberal democratic order with
"multiple agents of public power held to account
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Besides norms, she points to the operations of
NGOs-for example, in refugee camps-as evidencing "public" power.
Because individuals have multiple (rather than
unitary) interests, the role of the NGO is to be a
representative agent of a stakeholder community.
To perform that role, NGOs "must be institutionally delegated in some way, to ensure that they will
advance the particular outcome-interests that are
specified by their stakeholder constituents" (p.
142). Macdonald devotes several chapters to elaborating the conception and operation of her "liberal pluralist" model to show how "unelected
agents such as NGOs can possess legitimate representative agency" (p. 163) through "non-electoral
mechanisms of authorization and accountability"
(p. 165) to stakeholders. Specifically, the book
suggests the use of methods such as transparency,
stakeholder surveys, NGO codes of conduct,
monitoring NGOs, and reliable disempowerment
practices.
NGO Involvement in International Organizations, by Sergey Ripinsky and Peter Van den
Bossche, examines the legal basis within 1Os for
NGO involvement. Their research project consists of a series of case studies on ten of the most
vital agencies and institutions, and then weaves it
all together in a concluding chapter written from
a comparative perspective. For each organization
examined, the authors report whatever institutional law exists providing for NGO involvement
and then take note of the secondary rules on consultative status or accreditation, along with the
formal and informal practices in place. The case
studies look at the nature of NGOs permitted to
be involved, the forms of participation actually
used, the accreditation process, and practices for
reviewing NGOs. The organizations studied are
ECOSOC, International Labour Organization
(ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN
Conference on Trade and Development
' Macdonald does not take note, and was undoubt- (UNCTAD), UN Environment Programme
edly unaware, of an important 2002 article by Bosire (UNEP), UN Development Programme, World
Maragia proposing an ontology of world politics featuring multiple sites of authority and multiple sources of Bank, World Health Organization (WHO),
legitimacy, and then applying these concepts to the World Intellectual
Property Organization
question of the legitimacy of NGOs. Bosire Maragia,
(WIPO), and World Trade Organization
Almost There: Another Way of Conceptualizing and
ExplainingNGOs' Questfor Legitimacy in Global Poli- (WTO). All ten organizations invite in NGOs
for some activities; the differing practices "are
tics, 2 NON-ST. ACTORS & INT'L L. 301 (2002).

by their multiple overlapping 'stakeholder' communities" (p. 13).' Her definition of the exercise
of "public power" is a broad one embracing any
"prominent and influential role in the processes of
production and maintenance of autonomy-constraining regulative norms" (p. 64 ). The impact of
the norm on an individual generates a stake and
consequently gives those stakeholders "participatory entitlements" (p. 41) to exercise democratic
control. At the international level, as she explains,
"nation-state representation cannot achieve legitimate social choice in global politics" (p. 14)
because of inadequacies in representing diverse
interests, in responding to intensity of interest,
and in using rational deliberation. Macdonald,
who views herself as a "realist" (p. 32), is not suggesting that the "nation-state model of global representation" be abandoned, even though she views
it as "fundamentally flawed from a democratic
point of view" (p. 138). Rather, she proposes a
hybrid approach that "incorporates multi-stakeholder representation within more conventional
structures of representation by nation-states" (p.
15). For global politics, "all individuals whose
autonomy is problematically constrained by the
exercise of public power" (p. 102) are to be considered members of the stakeholder community.
Macdonald devotes a chapter to demonstrating
that NGOs can wield "public power" that, like all
public power, needs democratic control. While
conceding that many NGO activities are "private
power," particularly when done at "grassroots levels," she argues that when NGOs gain "privileged
access" to "authoritative institutional sites" such as
IOs (p. 65), the power exercised can properly be
viewed as "autonomy-constraining" and hence
"public" (p. 8 1). That is so not only because norms
developed by NGOs can be treated as authoritative, but also because such norms "can feed back
into the formal international legal system" (p. 6 9).
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explained by the specific characteristics of the
international organizations concerned" (p. 223).
In my view, the study's most important findings
are as follows. There is "no necessary or direct link
between the fact that the engagement with NGOs
is envisaged in the organization's constituent
instrument, and the intensity of such engagement" (p. 208). Only two of the ten organizations,
the IMF and the WTO, "have expressly taken a
position that engagement with civil society is primarily the task of national governments" (id.).
Official NGO advisory committees are uncommon. In the "less-NGO-friendly" organizations
(such as the WTO and WIPO), the trend has
been to allow NGOs to attend the rarely convened
formal meetings of the supreme organ but to deny
participation in organs that meet regularly. NGOs
have a formal right to propose agenda items only
in the ECOSOC and UNEP. In most of the accreditation processes, the NGOs being vetted are not
given an opportunity to speak or to be present.
Two international bodies, the ECOSOC and
WHO, have established formal grounds for withdrawal and suspension of an NGO's consultative
status.
The book reaches the conclusion that "international organizations would generally benefit from
a further 'legalization' of NGO involvement. Providing for explicit rules on engagement with
NGOs would contribute to the predictability of
this engagement and prevent arbitrariness" (p.
224). Although the authors recognize NGOs as
"fully-fledged actors in international governance"
(p. 1), they contend that "the gap between the
institutional activism of NGOs and their legal
standing in terms of international rights and duties
is growing" (p. 7).
This volume makes a useful contribution to the
literature on NGOs in international law by focusing on the administrative law governing NGO
participation. Each of the case studies is rich with
interesting detail, and the authors have taken great
care to document their points. The only major
flaw I see is that the book lacks both an index and
a bibliography. The publisher, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
should know better.

Civil Society Participation in European and
Global Governance is a product of the "Transformations of the State" project at the Collaborative
Research Centre at the University of Bremen. The
project's background assumption is that the democratic deficit of global governance can be ameliorated by more "deliberative democratization" (p.
2). The authors (all political scientists) posit that
"organized civil society may serve as a 'transmission belt' between a global citizenry and international organizations" (p. 208). The term "civil
society organizations" (CSOs) is used in the
book's title and in many of the essays, although
some of the authors use the term "NGO" synonymously.
The purpose of the project was to assess the
capacity of particular international institutions "to
bring about free, informed and inclusive deliberation-and, hence, a high level of democratic
quality" (p. 210). For this purpose, the authors
selected and measured four criteria: access to deliberation, transparency and access to information,
responsiveness to stakeholder concerns, and inclusion of all voices. The dataset for the study comprised thirty-two institutions at the international
level (for example, the IMF) or in the European
Union.
With respect to access and transparency for
CSOs, the authors were able to reach conclusions
by using a list of twenty indicators to rate each
institution; one indicator, for example, is whether
CSOs have the right to put topics on the agenda of
an 10. Overall, the researchers found that almost
all the institutions studied held consultations with
CSOs. The three exceptions were the Bank for International Settlements, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and the G8 Summits (although summit host governments may consult CSOs).
The authors found that responsiveness and
inclusiveness were not as easily measured. For
those criteria, the project performed case studies of
several institutions. These studies suggest that the
presence of CSOs can sometimes "expand the
range of viewpoints present in international negotiations and can give a voice to the concerns of
marginalized groups-such as indigenous peoples-that are not well represented in the intergovernmental process" (p. 28). The case studies
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also show, however, that the responsiveness of
intergovernmental decision makers to the concerns presented by CSOs "is surprisingly low even
under the most favourable circumstances" (p.
213), such as extensive opportunities for NGO
participation.
One of the best case studies, written by Lars
Thomann, examines the ILO. He begins by conceding that because of the ILO's tripartite structure, all four of the project's criteria "are fulfilled to
an extent not seen in any other international organization" (p. 76). But the theme of the chapter is
that the ILO is nevertheless deficient because there
is a "representational gap" (p. 82) in that only the
worker and employer organizations get that treatment. Thomann does not consider those organizations to be NGOs because their goals "are largely
orientated toward the interests of their members"
(p. 77). In his view, "the access of NGOs to the
policy-making level of the ILO-meaning the
[ILO's International Labour Conference] and the
supervisory mechanism-is rather limited and
marginalized" (id.). As a result, many workers "are
increasingly not represented" (p. 91) at the ILO.
In another essay, Claudia Kissling and Jens Steffek
also discuss the oversized role for workers and
employers at the ILO, and note that "[t]hese privileged partners have vigorously forestalled the
introduction of 'quadripartism' within the ILO
that would result from associating more closely
with CSOs" (p. 212).
All of the case studies are well done. Charlotte
Dany examines the UN World Summit of the
Information Society (held in 2003), which provided for active CSO participation. Steffek and
Ulrike Ehling examine the WTO and conclude
that "to] pportunities for civil society to influence
the deliberation process directly at the WTO are
quite scarce. Remarkably little has changed since
the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
became operational in 1948" (p. 110). Peter
Meyer compares the North Atlantic Treaty Association to the Organization for Cooperation and
Security in Europe and finds more opportunities
for CSOs in the OSCE, possibly because it is a
leaner organization than NATO.
In my view, the most valuable chapter in the
volume is written by Claudia Kissling, who exam-
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ines the evolution of the legal status of NGOs in
the international order. Her thesis is that providing "legal standing" (p. 32) to NGOs and interparliamentary assemblies will help to overcome
the legitimacy deficit in IOs. In other words,
Kissling seeks to show how the rights and duties of
NGOs have "legitimizing capabilities" (p. 33).
These rights and duties are not located in customary international law, she says, but rather are delineated within specific 1Os.
To examine multiple organizations using a
common framework, Kissling devises a comprehensive matrix to describe the degree of an NGO's
legal status. On an ascending scale, the status varies
from "no status" to "subject" to "person," and
then to the "comprehensive legal status" (p. 37).
For an NGO to be a subject, it has to enjoy rights
or duties. For example, there could be a right to
speak and a duty to fulfill certain accreditation
conditions. Kissling distinguishes a "person" from
a "subject" in that the NGO "person" can lodge a
complaint against an 1O or state to enforce the
NGO's rights. Analogously, the NGO person is
accountable for its duties. She also considers
whether the NGO's status is granted in treaty (primary) law or in secondary law. Kissling summarizes her findings in a table presenting a broad
range of 1Os divided into groups, including environment, development, human rights, economic
and financial affairs, and security. For each organization, she reports the degree of NGO status and
the year that such status was obtained, both in primary and secondary law. Only the ILO grants
comprehensive legal status-and did so in 1919.
The construction of this matrix is an impressive
achievement. The terms "person" and "subject"
are not ideal, but the categories that Kissling
employs are especially useful in showing the trends
for how governments and 1Os accord status to
NGOs. In my view, Kissling is right to see the
rights and duties of NGOs as indicia of the status
of NGOs in international law. One hopes that
scholars will invest time in understanding her
matrix in order to refine her analysis.
The last book to be reviewed emerges from a
multiyear research project at Tilburg University
and the University of Maastricht. The product is
a volume of essays examining the "legitimacy" of
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NGOs in international governance. The rationale
for the exercise is that "[a]s the activities of NGOs
have ever further-reaching consequences, their
ability to demonstrate the legitimacy of their activities becomes more important" (p. 7). The aim of
the project is to develop a workable concept of
legitimacy. The volume, NGO Involvement in
International Governance and Policy: Sources of
Legitimacy, consists of seven essays by members of
the research team, all edited by Anton Vedder. A
leadoff essay by Vivien Collingwood and Louis
Logister reports on the perceptions of NGO legitimacy by NGO officials and other stakeholders,
and is nicely written.
The volume attempts to deconstruct the concept of NGO legitimacy. Several of the authors
employ a three-part concept of legitimacy that
looks at moral, social, and regulatory aspects.
Moral legitimacy is whether the NGO's value and
norms are acceptable in principle for all, and
whether the NGO is effective at promoting those
norms. Social legitimacy is whether there is consent or representation of those involved or
affected. Regulatory legitimacy is whether the
NGO's involvement conforms to applicable international rules. The essay by Anke van Gorp presents the result of his study examining the Web
sites of selected NGOs, with the specific goal of
determining how much information is provided
for all three aspects. Among the findings is that
"there are no Internet-only NGOs" (p. 103) and
that some NGOs, such Greenpeace and Global
Witness, do not seek to represent anyone.
The essay by Peter Van den Bossche examines
regulatory legitimacy in the law of lOs. He sets out
to consider whether the actual NGO involvement
in major 1Os matches the rules of each organization prescribing NGO involvement. With regard
to allowing NGOs to be involved in the organization's activities, Van den Bossche finds that the
IMF and the World Bank do so without any
explicit legal basis and that the ECOSOC,
UNCTAD, and UNEP engage with NGOs in ways
that go further than technically allowed by the relevant rules. With respect to practices on accreditation, he finds that UNCTAD has not implemented its own substantive rules.

The essay by Menno Kamminga looks at various systems for regulating the status of NGOs at
both the national level and international levels.
For example, Kamminga reviews self-regulation
by NGOs and suggests that such codes are feasible
for NGOs that are focused on particular issues.
Another interesting finding concerns NGO coalitions, which can indirectly serve a mutually validating purpose. The essay's overall conclusion is
that "states are not at all the best judge of the legitimacy of NGOs" (p. 193).
The essay by Anton Vedder takes the debate
about NGO legitimacy to a higher level by suggesting that the focus should really be on possible
illegitimacy. In particular, he argues that "it does
not seem to make much sense to talk about NGOs
qualifying as legitimate, or about some NGOs
being more legitimate than others. It seems more
appropriate to establish whether, and if so, in what
ways the legitimacy of a specific NGO may be
doubted" (p. 208).
Overall, this book makes a useful contribution
to our understanding of NGO legitimacy, though
it is limited by its reliance on scholarship only from
the past twenty years. The bibliography does not
contain any book or article about NGOs written
earlier than 1989. One wonders why a group of
scholars would insulate themselves in that way,
particularly when located so closely to great
research libraries.
Although none of the books makes strong
claims that 10 legitimacy is enhanced by NGO
participation, the books do suggest that such participation provides value added to 1Os. As noted
above, Rebasti finds that NGOs can strengthen
the accountability of 1Os, and the Civil Society
Participation collection contends that NGOs
improve deliberation in 1Os. In arguing that
NGOs can provide democratic representation at
the international level, Macdonald is implicitly
suggesting that the state-centric conception oflOs
is not as democratic as it could be.
In a recent book review about NGO accountability in this Journal,Kenneth Anderson argues
against the idea that NGOs play "a legitimating
role in global governance." ' I agree with Anderson
' Kenneth Anderson, What NGO Accountability
Means-AndDoesNotMean, 103 AJIL 170, 176 (2009)
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to the extent that he is saying that NGOs are not
necessarily legitimacy enhancing and that lOs are
not necessarily deficient in legitimacy. But I do
think that at its best, NGO participation has
helped to ameliorate some of the worst pathologies
of 1Os, such as a lack of transparency and lack of
efforts to reconcile 1Os' functional missions with
those of parallel organizations. For example, I
believe it was the NGOs that instigated the pressure that led the WTO to be more sensitized to the
impact of trade on the environment and human
rights.
While all five books under review take a proNGO approach, Macdonald's book is different.
Whereas the other four books can be characterized
as mainstream, she offers a paradigm-shifting
model in which NGOs are viewed as representatives of stakeholders. Because NGOs are not
elected, she recommends establishment of nonelectoral mechanisms of democratic authorization
and accountability. Before reading Macdonald, I
had shared Anderson's view that the "glory of civil
society institutions ought to be that they are not
representative, and, because they are not, are free
to argue and shout their visions of social justice,
seek to persuade, and offer alternatives that representative institutions cannot." 5 Of course, Anderson qualifies this point by agreeing that NGOs
"still need to be accountable ... in the transparency sense, so that others can judge them and their
programs. ' '6 But the accountability he seeks is not
for the purpose of improving the representativeness of NGOs; both authors are employing the
term "accountability" but are using it somewhat
different ways. It will be interesting to see how
Anderson (who has written thoughtfully about
NGOs from a more skeptical position than the
books reviewed here) responds to Macdonald's
ambitious framework. Reading Macdonald's
book made me reconsider the question ofwhether
one should conceptualize NGOs not only as being
lobbyists or norm entrepreneurs, but also as carrying out representative functions in a democratic
(reviewing NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & INNOVATIONS (Lisa Jordan & Peter van
Tuijl eds., 2006)).
5 Id. at 177.
61d.

global system. The NGO debate has become more
complex.
STEVE CHARNOVITZ

Ofthe BoardofEditors
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS AND REFUGEE
STATUS: DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
REFUGEE LAW
International Refugee Law and Socio-economic
Rights: Refuge tom Deprivation. By Michelle
Foster. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007. Pp. xlvii, 387. Index.
$120.
Over the past two decades, international
human rights law has provided an increasingly
useful framework for interpreting key criteria of
the definition of a refugee. ' According to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention), a refugee is one who,
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country."2 A
human rights-based approach to analyzing this
definition helps to ensure the application of a universal and objective standard, thereby increasing
consistency and uniformity in decision making by
state parties regarding who qualifies for international protection. The concept of persecution is
now widely understood as a "sustained or systemic
' Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender and the
Human Rights Paradigm,15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133,
136 (2002); see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW
OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991); JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW 29-33 (2007) (examining the human

rights foundations of the Refugee Convention, infra
note 2, and discussing it a specialist human rights
treaty).
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art.
IA(2), July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150 amendedby Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
19 UST 6223, 606 UNTS 267 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention].

20091

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a
3
failure of state protection.
While refugee law differs from human rights
law in that it aims to provide surrogate state protection for certain individuals, rather than to monitor abuse and hold a state of origin accountable,
the two regimes have increasingly converged and
contributed to each other's growth. One of the
best examples of this phenomenon is the evolution
in our understanding of "gender based" persecution-such as rape, female genital cutting, and
family violence-which not only drew on prevailing human rights norms but also helped shape
them. 4 Economic and social rights, such as the
rights to food, health, housing, education, and
employment, highlight another area in which
human rights law and refugee law have the opportunity to help each other grow by exposing internal conflicts and pushing forward particular contextualized claims. In the same way that female
genital cutting represents a controversial and divisive issue within human rights circles, these circles
continue to debate the status and content of economic and social rights. While scholars initially
described economic and social rights as "second
generation" rights that require expenditure of
resources, compared to superior "first generation"
civil and political rights that simply imposed negative duties on states, our understanding of economic and social rights has rapidly changed.
Addressing economic and social rights in the context of adjudicating asylum claims will require
sharpening our understanding of the relevant
human rights standards, as well as deepening our
analysis of the refugee definition.
Michelle Foster's book, InternationalRefugee
Law andSocio-economic Rights: Refugetom Deprivation, comes at a time of growing synergy
between refugee law and human rights law and
provides a comprehensive and cohesive analysis to
the critical question of how states should respond
to refugee claims based on socioeconomic deprivation. Foster, senior lecturer and director of the
International Refugee Law Research Programme
at the University of Melbourne, utilizes internasupra note 1, at 104-05 (providing
pioneering analysis of persecution).
4 See Anker, supra note 1, at 138.
3 HATHAWAY,

tional human rights principles to analyze socioeconomic harm in the context of refugee law,
drawing on traditional methods of treaty interpretation. She persuasively argues that many claims
based on socioeconomic harm properly fall within
the scope of the Refugee Convention. Contrary to
what some critics have suggested, Foster does not
make any radical arguments to expand protection.5 She simply contends that the Convention
"is capable of accommodating a more complex
and nuanced analysis" that recognizes many types
of refugee and asylum claims with an "economic
element" (p. 1). By linking the refugee definition
to developments in our understanding of economic and social rights under international
human rights law, Foster's book pushes forward a
debate about the deeply entrenched but overly
simplistic dichotomy between
"economic
migrants" and "political refugees" that has thus far
been "drastically underdeveloped" and is not comprehensible under the Refugee Convention itself
(p. 4).6 Since this dichotomy has developed largely
in response to political concerns and psychological
fears, rather than in response to sound legal analysis of the Refugee Convention, Foster's detailed
examination of the legal issues represents a critical
and original contribution.
5 See, e.g., ZacharyA. Lomo, Book Review, 21 J. REFUGEE STUD. 401, 403 (2008) (reviewing MICHELLE
FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND
SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION (2007)) (misleadingly stating that Foster

attempts "to convert economic deprivation ... into a
new independent reason for eligibility"); Rebecca
Heller, Book Review, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 516, 517
(2008) (reviewing MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIOECONOMIC

RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION (2007)) (mischaracterizing Foster's analysis as advocating "system-

atic relaxation" ofthe requirements of the Refugee Convention).
6
See, e.g., Guy

S. GOODWIN-GILL

& JANE

MCADAM, THE REFUGEE UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 15 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that "'economic refugees'-the term has long been disfavoured... are not
included" in the concept of a refugee); see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED

STATES 233 (3d ed. 1999) ("Although the refugee def-

inition does not embrace voluntary economic migrants, a person who has left his country for both
political and economic reasons should not be barred
from asylum .... ").
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Foster structures her book around the key elements of the refugee definition.7 While she places
the most emphasis on clarifying the concept of
persecution in the context of economic and social
rights, she also addresses the requirement of a
causal connection between the feared persecution
and at least one of the five protected grounds (race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, and political opinion), as well as the
meaning of the grounds themselves, especially the
"particular social group" ground. To illustrate and
establish her arguments, Foster draws on various
levels of decision-making from five common law
jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and the United States).
The first part of Foster's book explores the
human rights approach to interpreting the Refugee Convention, generally considered the "dominant" view. 8 While Foster recognizes and discusses
inconsistencies between and within jurisdictions,
she stresses the need for both a coherent frame' See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, and accompanying text. This is the standard method of analysis.
See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 1; GOODWINGILL & MCADAM, supra note 6.
8 See, e.g., UNHCR Division of International Protection, Gender-RelatedPersecution:An Analysis of Recent
Trends, 9 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 79,

82- 83 (1997); MARK SYMES, CASELAW ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S
INTERPRETATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES 70 (2000) ("The dominant

trend of the authorities is to accept the human rights
approach."); Dirk Vanheule, A Comparison ofthe Judicial Interpretationsof the Notion of Refigee, in EUROPE
AND REFUGEES: A CHALLENGE? 91-106 (Jean-Yves

Carlier & Dirk Vanheule eds., 1997) (studying the judicial interpretation of the refugee definition in 5000 cases
from 13 European countries, Canada, and the United
States, and finding that "the only essential criterion
applied, either expressly or implicitly, by the courts
appears to be the disproportional or discriminatory violation of basic human rights for one of the reasons mentioned in the Geneva Convention"); Anker, supranote
1, at 135; HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 106; GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 6, at 285-384. For
criticisms of the human rights approach, see, e.g.,
Daniel J. Steinbock, Interpretingthe Refugee Definition,
45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 782 (1998); NIRAJ NATHWANI, RETHINKING REFUGEE LAW 21, 76-77
(2003); Daniel Wilsher, Non-State Actors and the Definition of a Refugee in the United Kingdom: Protection,
Accountability or Culpability, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.
68, 98 (2003).
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work and an objective standard toward ensuring
consistency in interpreting an international treaty.
She persuasively argues that international human
rights law should provide this framework based on
the language, context, and purpose of this Convention as well as the axiom that international
obligations must be interpreted by reference to the
broader framework of international law.'
These arguments build on the work ofJames C.
Hathaway, who has argued that the Refugee Convention and its Protocol are "part and parcel of
international human rights law"'° and, more specifically, "a remedial or palliative branch of human
rights law ...[as well as] a system for the surrogate
or substitute protection of human rights."" In his
1991 book, The Law ofRefugee Status, Hathaway
explained that the International Bill of Rights
(IBR), comprised of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), is "essential to an
understanding of the minimum duty owed by a
state to its nationals," given "the soundness of its
standards, its regular invocation by states, and its
role as the progenitor for the many more specific
human rights accords."' 2 In light of significant
developments in human rights law, Hathaway
subsequently acknowledged that one could interpret "being persecuted" by reference to a wider set
of international human rights instruments,
although he still cautioned against rushing to
embrace "every new human rights idea that comes
along." 3 Hathaway reasoned that "a commitment
to legal positivism requires first, that we focus on
' See Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, Art.
31(3)(c), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
UNTS 331 (requiring interpretation to take into
account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties").

10JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2005).

" Id.at 5.
12

HATHAWAY, supranote 1, at 106.

3

See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, The Relationship
Between Human Rights and Refugee Law: What Refugee
Judges Can Contribute,in THE REALITIES OF REFUGEE
DETERMINATION ON THE EVE OF A NEW MILLENNIUM: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 80, 86 (1999).
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legal standards-primarily treaties-not on
so-called 'soft law' which simply doesn't yet
bespeak a sufficient normative consensus."14
While "evolving standards" could serve "as a
means to contextualize and elaborate the substantive content of genuine legal standards," they
should not "be treated as authoritative in and of
themselves." 5 Hathaway further argued that only
treaties ratified by a "respectable super-majority,"
with "support in all major geo-political groupings," carried sufficient legal authority to be used
to interpret the Refugee Convention. 6 As Foster
notes, Hathaway found that the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) all satisfied this test (p. 64).
Hathaway's analysis advocated relying on "core
norms" of international human rights law to
define forms of serious harm that rise to the level
7
of persecution.'
Foster, like Hathaway, believes that "refugee
status adjudication should properly take into
account evolving developments in human rights
law" (p. 63, emphasis added), noting that "the specific conventions do make significant contributions to a more complex understanding of equality, which go considerably beyond the IBR" (p.
65). While she too remains cautious about relying
on regional standards and treaties that have not yet
attained the requisite level of support, she explores
situations where "soft law" may play a role in
assisting in treaty interpretation, such as a case
involving someone with a mental or physical disability.'" Foster also carefully analyzes and seriously considers possible objections to the human
"4

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

Id.
" Many scholars advocate a cautious approach to
enforcing economic and social rights in general. See, e.g.,
James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More:
Rethinking SupranationalLitigation of Economic and
Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217,
219 (2004) (arguing that "successful promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights in the Inter-American
17

rights approach, such as the argument that it is
both over- and under-inclusive and that it is not
appropriate to hold states accountable to obligations set forth in treaties to which they are not parties (pp. 75-86).
In chapter three, Foster discusses current conceptual approaches to socioeconomic deprivation
and the problems with these approaches. The first
major conceptual approach, which Foster refers to
as "Carlier's 'Three Scales"' model, is a normative
hierarchical approach that gives civil and political
rights a higher priority than economic and social
rights, and provides that the more fundamental
the right in question, the less severe the treatment
needs to be to constitute persecution.' 9 Foster
rejects this normative hierarchy because the distinctions between first and second generation
rights have been undermined as simplistic and
unsustainable. Not only is it now widely understood that all rights contain both positive and negative components and that many civil and political
rights require expenditure, but also the United
Nations has repeatedly reinforced the interdependence and equal importance of the two categories
of rights.
The second conceptual approach, which Foster
calls Hathaway's "hierarchy of obligations"
model, proposes a four-tier structure to explain
when a violation of core entitlements amounts to
persecution. 2" Foster explains that while the
system should be incremental, firmlygrounded in established precedent, and always linked to vigorous social
movements and effective advocacy strategies").
19SeeJean-Yves Carlier, GeneralReport, in WHO ISA
REFUGEE? A COMPARATIVE CASE LAWSTUDY(Jean-

Yves Carlier, Dirk Vanheule, Klaus Hullman & Carlos
Pefia Galiano eds., 1997).
20 Violation of the first tier, consisting of rights in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that
were made immediately binding in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), always
constitutes persecution. Violation of the second tier,
consisting of rights in the UDHR that are codified in
ICCPR but allow for derogation during public emergency, generally constitutes persecution unless derogation was strictly required, nondiscriminatory, and consistent with other aspects ofinternational law. Violation
of the third tier, consisting of rights in the UDHR that
are codified in the ICESCR, constitutes persecution if
the state ignores these interests despite the fiscal ability
to respond, if the state discriminates, or in cases of an

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand have
purportedly adopted Hathaway's "hierarchy of
obligations" model, many courts in these jurisdictions are actually applying a model more akin to
Carlier's "normative hierarchical" approach (pp.
120-23).21 "In other words, courts and tribunals
that rely on a hierarchical model tend to equate the
level of hierarchy with the extent to which the relevant right is 'fundamental' or a core entitlement,
which in turn determines the extent to which a
type of harm can constitute persecution" (p. 120).
In actuality, Hathaway's model merely reflects the
greater complexity involved in determining
whether an economic and social right has been
breached; it is not based on the notion that economic and social rights are normatively less
important than civil and political rights. Yet courts
have a tendency to apply a much higher standard
to claims involving economic and social rights
based on the idea that economic and social rights
are of lesser value and that the level of violation
necessary to establish persecution must therefore
be much higher. Foster forcefully argues that
courts misinterpret Hathaway's model when they
find third-level violations of economic and social
rights only in cases where the harm is extreme or
life-threatening. Likewise, Foster contends that
jurisdictions that have not formally accepted the
human rights framework, such as the United
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States, tend to impose a higher standard for socioeconomic claims. Requiring socioeconomic harm
to amount to a threat to subsistence contradicts
any coherent analysis of persecution, which is generally understood as serious harm, not life-threatening conditions. Moreover, socioeconomic harm
cannot be isolated and analyzed separately from
physical harm because the two are inextricably
intertwined (e.g., someone deprived of sufficient
food, clean water, or medical care suffers physical
harm).
Foster's analysis of the case law is particularly
helpful in revealing the significant level of confusion and misunderstanding about socioeconomic
rights. For example, adjudicators of asylum claims
generally fail to realize that the notions of "progressive realization" and resource constraints do
not apply where the state imposes deliberately retrogressive measures or engages in discrimination.22 Although Hathaway's approach recognizes
these types of violations as persecution, Foster
contends that his approach has contributed to
rigid analysis by the courts. She also questions the
distinctions on which Hathaway's actual model is
based, noting that the distinction between immediate and progressive duties does not line up with

22 The notion that retrogression violates a state's obligations under international law isnot purely theoretical
and has been recognized in other contexts. The Colombian Constitutional Court, for example, has long held
extreme violation that is tantamount to deprivation of that "all retrogression is presumptively unconstitutional
life or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. and therefore subject to strict scrutiny." Alicia Ely
Finally, violation of the fourth tier, consisting of rights Yamin, Beyond Compassion: The CentralRole ofAccountin the UDHR that are not codified in either the ICCPR abilityin Applying a Human RightsFrameworkto Health,
or the ICESCR, is not usually sufficient to constitute per- 10(2) HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS J. 1, 12 & n.89
secution because these rights are not subject to a binding (2008) (citing C 251/97, Segunda Sala de Revisi6n,
legal obligation. See HATHAWAY, supra note 1, at 109. Constitutional Court of Colombia, 1997). Conse21Foster cites numerous decisions that misinterpret
quently, when Colombia's government sought to
Hathaway's analysis. For example, in the seminal Gashi reduce drastically spending on the Subsidized Health
Insurance Scheme, the Constitutional Court found that
decision, the UK Immigration Appeal Tribunal noted
the "four distinct types of obligations in a hierarchy of the cutbacks violated the law. Id.at 12 & n.90 (citing C
relative importance," a phrase that has been repeated in
1165/2000, Segunda Sala de Revisi6n, Constitutional
numerous subsequent UK decisions. Gashi v. Sec'y of Court of Colombia, 2000; C 040/2004 Segunda Sala de
State for Home Dep't, Appeal No. HX/75677/95
Revisi6n, Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2004).
Indeed, the court has found that the government vio(13695) (Immigr. App. Trib. 1996) (unreported),
[1997] Immigr. & Nat'lityL. Rep. 96, 100;seealsoHor- lates the principle of progressive realization whenever it
vath v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2001] 1 A.C. takes step that contradict the aim of achieving universal
489, para. 48 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("In an
coverage, as set forth in both the Colombian Constituattempt to classify the gravity of the breaches of the tion and legislation. Id. at 12 & n.91 (citing C 130/02,
human rights, Hathaway proposed the helpful division
Segunda Sala de Revisi6n, Constitutional Court of
into four categories.").
Colombia, 2002).
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the distinction between civil and political rights on
the one hand and economic and social rights on
the other. Moreover, she argues that Hathaway's
reliance on the concept of derogability is not a
meaningful method of distinguishing between
rights.
Foster's analysis highlights how refugee law
must grapple with shifts in the normative development of socioeconomic rights. After discussing
how various international bodies, especially the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee), have provided greater
content to economic and social rights in recent
years, Foster proposes using the concept of "minimum core obligations" to help define when violations of economic and social rights rise to the
level of persecution. While the idea of using "core"
rights is not new, Foster greatly expands on this
idea, arguing that the "core obligations" approach
would provide a broad framework for adjudicators, while allowing for evolution at the same time.
As examples, Foster examines how the core obligations approach may help in the proper analysis of
asylum claims based on violations of the right to
education and the right to health.
In chapters five and six, Foster turns to other
critical elements of the refugee definition: the
required causal connection and the five protected
grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group, and political opinion).23 She discusses how the challenges involved
in establishing the causal connection between the
feared persecution and a protected ground are
magnified in the context of claims involving economic deprivation, as adjudicators tend to invoke
concepts of "economic" or "voluntary" migrants
as a method of reducing complexity and automatically dismissing the claims. Foster argues that
proper application of the "mixed motives" doctrine (the idea that mixed factors can explain the
fear of being persecuted) and the related notion
that the protected ground need only constitute
part of the reason for the well-founded fear, coupled with an understanding that someone need
not be "singled out" for persecution, help to over23

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

come many of the traditional obstacles to socioeconomic claims. Moreover, after examining different approaches to understanding whether the
causal connection requires an element of intention, Foster argues that the text, context, and purpose of the Refugee Convention best support an
approach that focuses on the reasons that a person
fears persecution, as opposed to approaches that
focus on the intention of either the persecutor or
the state (pp. 274-75).24 While she recognizes
that "the predominant approach in common law
jurisprudence as a whole undoubtedly remains
one of requiring intent" (p. 280), she identifies
tentative steps by courts, as well as increasing support by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and academics, towards the predicament approach, which holds promise for encompassing claims based on socioeconomic deprivation despite inability to show individual intent.
Finally, Foster turns to the five protected
grounds. All five grounds are potentially relevant
to claims based on socioeconomic deprivation, but
Foster's analysis focuses on "membership of a particular social group" (pp. 292-339). After explaining the different conceptual approaches to interpreting the social-group ground, Foster explores
how various socioeconomic claims-such as those
based on caste, economic class, occupation, and
disability-could be brought under this ground.
Thus, insofar as ZacharyA. Lomo criticizes Foster
for "attempt[ing] to convert economic deprivation.., into a new independent reason for eligibility for refugee status," he mischaracterizes her
argument, which persuasively shows that certain
claims based on socioeconomic deprivation fit
within the existing criteria for establishing refugee
status.2 Moreover, in arguing that Foster "avoids
placing the problem ofeconomic deprivation in its
proper perspective" by failing to consider issues
such as the "vast inequalities between western
countries and developing countries resulting from
historical injustices" and "destructive neo-liberal
24 See James C. Hathaway, Michigan Guidelines on
Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
211, 215 (2002).
25 Lomo, supra note 5, at 403.
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economic policies,"" Lomo misses the point that
refugee law's sole purpose is to provide surrogate
protection in individual cases, not to address
global injustices.
In her conclusion, Foster addresses some
important policy questions. Recognizing that
many adjudicators fear "opening the floodgates"
and creating an "unmanageable situation" by
embracing a more expansive interpretation (pp.
344-45), Foster dissipates this fear by showing
that it assumes a much more expansive conclusion
than the analysis justifies. All of the world's poor
could not claim refugee status since they would
have to satisfy each element of the refugee definition, including the persecution and nexus elements. Moreover, the "floodgates" argument
falsely assumes that all who satisfy the refugee definition will leave their home countries and seek
protection in another state, when, in fact, relatively few people do so. Critics such as Rebecca
Heller underestimate both the rigor required to
meet elements of the refugee definition and the
difficulty of traveling to another state to seek protection. 27 Moreover, contrary to Lomo's suggestion, 28 Foster does not seek to "diminish or obliterate" the distinction between refugees and
migrants, but to "sharpen and clarify" it. The
notion that the boundary between migrants and
refugees has become blurred is far from radical; as
refugee scholar Guy S. Goodwin-Gill has
acknowledged, "[o]nce thought to be readily distinguishable, migratory and refugee flows are now
interwoven, perhaps inextricably, and are assisted
by the booming business in the traffic of human
beings."29 Foster upholds the distinction between
those who flee because their fundamental human
rights are violated and those flee for other reasons,
but she seeks to better incorporate violations of
economic and social rights into the refugee determination.
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Foster's detailed and insightful book comes at a
time of vigorous debate around economic, social,
and cultural rights. While various scholars have
sought to clarify the role, meaning, and enforceability of these rights in the context of international human rights law, Foster's book makes an
original contribution by expounding on socioeconomic rights violations in the context of refugee
law. Her proposal to use a "core obligations"
approach to analyze refugee claims deserves particular attention given the current focus on this
approach.3' The basic idea behind a "minimum
core" is that identifying certain essential obligations helps to ensure that states provide people
with the basic conditions under which they can
live in dignity, thereby providing a "bottom line"
for state responsibility. The Maastricht Guidelines, articulated in 1997, state that minimum
core obligations "apply irrespective of the availability of the resources of the country concerned or
any other factors and difficulties. ' 3 1 Thus, minimum core obligations are immediately enforceable and not subject to progressive realization.
Nondiscrimination is considered part of the
minimum core content of all rights in the ICESCR
and, as Foster stresses, applies immediately to all
See, e.g., Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell,
Introduction, in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING
30

A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 1 (Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell

eds., 2002); Katharine G. Young, The Minimum Coreof
Economic and Social Rights:A Concept in Searchof Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2008).
31 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 9, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 691, 695 (1998) [hereinafter Maastricht
Guidelines]. In 1986, the International Commission of
Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg
(Maastricht, Netherlands), and the Urban Morgan Institute of Human Rights of the University ofCincinnati convened an important meeting oftwenty-nine human rights
experts that produced the Limburg Principles on the
Implementation of the ICESCR. See Symposium: The
Implementation ofthe InternationalCovenanton Economic,
Socialand CulturalRights: Introduction,9 HUM. RTS. Q
26 Id.
121 (1987). Ten years later, in January 1997, the same
27 See Heller, supra note 5, at 517.
institutions convened another group of human rights
28 Lomo, supra note 5, at 402.
experts in Maastricht to elaborate guidelines to further clar29 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Migration: International ify the Limburg Principles, given dramatic changes in the
world order and the substantial work of the UN CommitLaw andHuman Rights, in MANAGING MIGRATION:
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the interTIME FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME? 160,
162 (Bimal Ghosh ed., 2000).
vening decade.
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states.32 According to the Committee, the minimum core of the main economic, social, and cultural rights has become customary international
law and is therefore binding on all states, regardless
ofwhether they have signed or ratified treaties pro33
tecting those rights.
The idea of defining core minimum obligations
appeared in the human rights literature during the
1980s, gaining authority in 1991 when the Committee adopted General Comment No. 3, declaring that "a minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of,at the very least, minimum essential
levels of each of these rights is incumbent upon
every State party."34 That same year, the Committee adopted General Comment No. 4 on the right
to housing, but then dropped the project of defining minimum core obligations." During the past
decade, the Committee has resumed the core obligations project in earnest, adopting General Comments on the rights to education, food, health,
water, and work.36 In developing the content of
The Maastricht Guidelines provide that any discrimination on account of "race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status with the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment
or exercise of economic, social and cultural rights constitutes a violation ofthe Covenant." Maastricht Guidelines, supranote 31, at para. 11.
33 See, e.g., UN Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, Concluding Comments (Israel) (May
23, 2003), UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90, para. 31 (noting that "basic economic, social and cultural rights, as
part of the minimum standards of human rights, are
guaranteed under customary international law"); see also
32

SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS:
STATES' HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 124 (2006); MARGOT E.
SALOMON, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: WORLD POVERTY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-25 (2007).
" UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3, The Nature
ofStates Parties Obligations, UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex
III (1990) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3].
35CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to
Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1)), UN Doc. E/1992/23
(1991), Annex III.
31 CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The Right to

Education, UN Doc. E/C. 12/1999/10; CESCR, General
Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, UN
Doc. E/C12/1999/5 (1999); CESCR, General Comment
No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of

the minimum core, the Committee has relied
largely on the reports of state parties, perhaps due
to the absence of an enforceability mechanism
under the ICESCR. While scholars such as
Katharine G. Young have criticized an approach
based on consensus, the Committee's General
Comments have nevertheless "developed an
authoritativeness usually reserved for advisory
opinions and enjoy a significant degree of accep37
tance by state parties."
More recently, the Committee has shifted its
focus from identifying areas of consensus to creating "a template of 'core obligations"' that "rests
on, but seeks to supersede, previous analytical distinctions and typologies, such as the distinction
drawn between 'conduct'-based obligations and
'result'-based obligations, and the indexing of
the
different duties to respect, protect, and fulfill
rights. ' 38 Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell
describe the trend of expanding core obligations as
a "rising floor," and question whether minimum
obligations can be identified with any conviction given this context. They suggest that returning to a narrower view of minimum obligations
may help. 39 Young expresses much more skepticism about the core obligations approach, criticizing it as being "far from coherent," despite "the
heavy analytical arsenal."4" She notes that the
Committee keeps changing how it defines core
obligations and that little overlap exists between
these core obligations and the normatively prioritized principles set forth in the treaties.4 While
Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 [hereinafter General
Comment No. 14]; CESCR, General Comment No. 15:
The Right to Water, UN Doc. E/C. 12/2002/11 (2002);
CESCR, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work,
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (2005).
37 Young, supra note 30, at 143 & n.17 4 (citing M.
MAGDALENA SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS 42 (2003); MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIALAND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVEL-

OPMENT 91 (1995)).
38 Id. at 152 & n.22 4 .
39 Chapman & Russell, supra note 30, at 14.

Young, supra note 30, at 154.
Id. at 155-56. For example, Young notes that General Comment No. 3, supra note 34, para. 10, allowed
40
41
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the Committee may be responding to the unique
obligations raised by each right, Young argues that
this flux fails to explain why the Committee has
assigned very different core obligations to rights
that raise similar distributional questions, such as
the right to food and the right to water.
Although Foster's book does not address the
concerns regarding the core obligations approach
raised by scholars such as Young, it nevertheless
helps to propel the discussion of economic and
social rights by suggesting a relatively concrete way
of incorporating violations of these rights into refugee status determination. Given that Foster
focuses on the individualized adjudication of refugee claims, not the human rights project in general, some criticisms of the core obligations
approach seem less relevant, such as arguments
that this approach will weaken the goal of fully
implementing economic, social, and cultural
rights and that it directs attention only to the performance of developing states.42 Furthermore,
Foster's view of minimum core obligations as flexible and evolving helps to counter the fear of the
floor becoming the ceiling.
Like proponents of the core obligations
approach who believe that this concept will promote enforceability, Foster's main point is simply
that violations of minimum obligations can serve
as a benchmark for assessing when harm rises to
the level of persecution. While measuring whether
a state has fulfilled its minimum core obligations
remains thorny and problematic, growing literature has appeared on this subject, including a
newly developed index that "demonstrates the
possibility of measuring obligations for progres-
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sive realization of core economic and social
rights," allowing comparison across countries and
providing a means to flag state underperformance. 43 The index is still missing some important elements, including a measure of discrimination and certain core rights, but it represents a
useful step in the right direction.
Foster's arguments echo those of scholars such
as Craig Scott and Philip Alston, who contend that
the concept of the minimum core is analytically
useful and that adjudicators' failure to utilize this
concept signals ideological resistance to economic,
social, and cultural rights. 44 Like Foster, these
commentators stress that courts have failed to
draw on international documents that elucidate
the concept of the minimum core. Advocates seeking to enforce the economic and social rights provisions of South Africa's 1996 Constitution have
further developed arguments about the utility of
the minimum obligations approach. 45 While the
South African Constitutional Court has rejected a
notion of a minimum core that is immediately
enforceable regardless of resources, some recent
decisions suggest that it may be moving closer
towards recognizing core obligations.4 6 Furthermore, in July 2008, the Colombian Constitutional Court issued a seminal decision calling for
43 See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer &
Susan Randolph, Measuring the Progressive Realization
ofHuman Rights Obligations:An Index ofEconomic and
Social Rights Fulfillment 8 (U. Conn. Working Paper
2008-22), available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
working/2008-22.pdf.
" See Craig Scott & Phillip Alston, Adjudicating
ConstitutionalPrioritiesin a TransnationalContext: A
Comment on Soobramoneys Legacy andGrootboom's
Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 213

(2000).
an infringement of the minimum core when the State
party made "every effort ...to use all resources that are
at its disposal to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations," whereas General Comment
No. 14, supra note 36, para. 47, provides that "a State
party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with ...core obligations ...
which are non-derogable."
42 Young, supra note 30, at 114; see alo Anker, supra
note 1, at 153-54 ("Refugee law offers a particular structuring that confronts the human rights questions, but less
contentiously than under the human rights regime's more
ambitious framework. Refugee law does not seek to reform
states and does not address root causes.").

45 See, e.g., DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTYAND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS 178-

237 (2007) (arguing that the South African Constitutional Court should embrace a minimum core obligations approach in interpreting economic and social
rights); Sandra Liebenberg, SouthAfrica tEvolvingJurisprudence on Socioeconomic Rights: An Effective Tool in
ChallengingPoverty? 6 L. DEM. & DEV. 159 (2002).
46 See, e.g., Dennis M. Davis, Socioeconomic Rights:
Do They Deliver The Goods?6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 687
(2008); Lisa Forman,Justice andJusticiability:AdvancingSolidarityandJusticeThrough SouthAfiicans'Rightto
HealthJurisprudence,27 MED. & L. 661 (2008).
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modification of the entire health system, which
interpreted the country's social insurance plan as
defining an immediately enforceable minimum
core of rights. 4 7 In recent years, Amnesty International has also turned its attention to social and
economic rights, using the language of minimum
core obligations.48 If the concept of a minimum
core can prove analytically useful in these complex
situations involving general rights violations, it
should also prove useful in the refugee status determination, which requires simply an individualized
decision about whether someone should receive
international protection based on a very particular
49
set of facts.
One important issue that scholars and activists
have debated and that Foster's proposal raises is
whether courts are the proper forum for defining
the content of economic and social rights. Based
on the South African experience, some commentators argue that judges retreat into models of
adjudication based on traditional legal practice
even when armed with progressive texts. 5" With
respect to refugee status determination, one may
question more generally whether decision makers
would be overstepping the boundaries of their
legitimate function, as well as their expertise, by
becoming involved in identifying violations of
minimum obligations. Foster briefly addresses
these concerns by noting that reliance on an objective framework is less prone to error, as it increases
the opportunity for judicial review, and that the
risk of misunderstanding human rights provisions
is reduced by interpretive guidance from the Committee. Furthermore, the risk of overstepping
" Corte Constitucional de Colombia, Sala Segunda
de Revisi6n, Sentencia T-760 (July 31, 2008) (Magistrado Ponente: Manuel Jos6 Cepeda). The decision also
provides a process for implementing the modification of
the country's health system. Id.
48 See Amnesty International, What Are Economic,
Socialand CulturalRights? at http://www.amnesty.org/
en/economic-and-social-cultural-rights/what-are-escr
(visited Apr. 16, 2009).
"' See Anker, supra note 1, at 143 ("Refugee law can
also sharpen the focus of debates within the human
rights discourse by grounding them in the circumstances of a real person seeking refugee law's particular,
palliative solution.").
50 See, e.g., Davis, supranote 46, at 709.

boundaries is much less in the context of refugee
law, which has a purely palliative function: "[a]
refugee decision-maker has neither the jurisdiction nor ability to make a positive finding of state
responsibility vis-a-vis the state of origin" (p. 80).
Recent developments in U.S. jurisprudence
highlight and reinforce many of Foster's arguments, not only by showing the general confusion
that pervades cases involving economic harm but
also by confirming that adjudicators tend to apply
a higher standard- or to forego proper legal analysis altogether-in such cases. In 2006, the Second Circuit remanded the case of Mirzoyan v.
Gonzales to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the highest U.S. administrative authority
for immigration issues, to clarify the correct standard for assessing when economic harm amounts
to persecution. 5 1 The court noted that the BIA had
at times referenced the "deliberate imposition of
substantial economic disadvantage" standard,
which was introduced by the Ninth Circuit nearly
forty years ago in Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service and subsequently adopted by other
circuits. 52 However, the BIA had also stated in In
re Acosta that persecution "could consist of economic deprivation or restrictions so severe that
they constitute a threat to an individual's life or
53
freedom."
In 2007, the BIA issued its decision in In re
T-Z-, which clarified that claims involving
51Mirzoyan v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 219-20 (2d
Cir. 2006) (considering whether someone who was
denied admission to a prestigious college, could not find
a job in her profession, and was discharged from her job
as an unskilled worker on account of her ethnicity had
been subjected to persecution). The Second Circuit suggested that Mirzoyan "likely could not prevail under the
standard referenced in Acosta, . .. but might prevail
under the Kovac standard." Id. at 223.
52 Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969);
see also Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep'r of Justice, 293
F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2002); Yong Hao Chen v. INS, 195
F.3d 198, 204 (4th Cir. 1999); Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d
210, 216 (7th Cir. 1996); Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376,
1379 (10th Cir. 1992); Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824,
845-46 (6th Cir. 1970).
13 In reAcosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,222 (BIA 1985),
overruled on other grounds by INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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economic harm should be assessed under the stan-4
5
dard for nonphysical forms of harm or suffering.
Quoting a 1978 House Report, the BIA explained
that this standard requires "the deliberateimposition ofsevere economic disadvantageor the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other
essentials oflife."55 According to the BIA, the second clause of the standard refers to a situation
where "economic persecution may involve the
deliberate deprivation of basic necessities such that
life or freedom is threatened," while the first clause
refers to a situation, such as "an extraordinarily
severe fine or wholesale seizure of assets," that is "so
severe as to amount to persecution, even though
the basic necessities of life might still be attainable."' 56 In embracing this definition, the BIA
stressed that both the Acosta formulation and the
House Report use the term "severe," rather than
"substantial," in describing the level of harm
required for persecution, indicating a higher stan57
dard than set forth in Kovac.
The BIA further stated that the "economic difficulties must be above and beyond those generally
shared by others in the country of origin and
involve noticeably more than mere loss of social
advantages or physical comforts," although an
applicant "need not demonstrate a total deprivation of livelihood or total withdrawal of all economic opportunity in order to demonstrate harm
amounting to persecution." 5 ' By way of example,
the BIA indicated that "[a] particularly onerous
fine, a large-scale confiscation of property, or a
sweeping limitation of opportunities to continue
51In re T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 170 (BIA
2007) (citingln reLaipenieks, 18 1.& N. Dec. 433,457
(BIA 1983), rev'don othergrounds, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
55Id.at 171 (emphasis added) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
95-1452, at 5, as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700,
4704).
56

Id.

51Id.at 172-73. The BIA explicitly rejected an

"open-ended 'substantial economic disadvantage'" test,
noting that "(a] heavy fine against a wealthy individual
might be seen as a substantial economic disadvantage,
even if the person remains relatively wealthy and experienced no meaningful change in life style or standard of
living."
Id.at 173 n.10.
5
11Id at 173.
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to work in an established profession or business
may amount to persecution even though the applicant could otherwise survive." 59
Since the BIA issued its decision in T-Z-,
however, some courts have continued to require
economic harm to threaten life or freedom to constitute persecution. For example, in Makatengkeng
v. Gonzales, which involved a citizen of Indonesia
who could not find employment because of his
albinism, the Eighth Circuit cited the standard in
T-Z- but went on to state that "[e]xcept in a
few circumstances, our court has continued to
require a showing that allegations of economic
hardship threaten the petitioner's life or freedom
in order to rise to the level of persecution." 60 While
the court noted that "[i] n the proper case, it might
be appropriate for our court to revisit the standard
for proving economic persecution," it concluded
that "this ... is not that case." 61 Given that
Makatengkeng was able to support his family by
starting his own business, the court found that his
allegations "[did] not rise to the level of economic
persecution under any of the standards." 62 Likewise, in Beck v. Mukasey, the Eighth Circuit found
that a Roma couple from Hungary who had been
discriminated against during their education and
relegated to low-level agricultural jobs failed to
demonstrate past persecution, reasoning that "private employment was available, so the economic
discrimination was not sufficiently harsh to con63
stitute a threat to life or freedom."
Most recently, however, in Ngengwe v. Mukasey, which involved a widow from Cameroon, the
Eighth Circuit seemed to embrace the standard in
T-Z- in finding that the immigration judge
had "offered no analysis, and cited no case law, on
why the choice between forced marriage, death, or
59

Id. at 174.

60 Makatengkeng v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 876, 883
(8th Cir. 2007). The BIA issued its decision in T-Zwhile Makatengkeng's petition for review was pending
with the Eighth Circuit. See id. at 876; T-Z-, 24 1. &
N. Dec. at 163.
61 Makatengkeng, 495 F.3d at 884.
62

Id.

Beck v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir.
2008) (internal quotations omitted).
63
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paying an unaffordable bride's price does not constitute persecution." ' The court further noted
that the immigration judge "did not consider
Ngengwe's argument that her in-laws confiscated
all her property, and threatened to take her children," which is "related to whether non-physical
persecution occurred."65 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the BIA to determine in the
first instance "whether the combination of all the
actions constitutes past persecution." 66 Decisions
like Ngengwe not only highlight the confusion
about the correct standard for analyzing claims of
socioeconomic persecution but also underscore
Foster's argument that immigration judges tend to
discount this type of harm without any real analysis. 67 Of course, immigration judges frequently
make the same type of errors in cases involving
physical harm, failing to consider all incidents of
physical harm in the record or discounting certain
forms of physical harm, such as sexual violence.
Just as the immigration judge who considered
Ngengwe's case did not understand that choosing
between paying an unaffordable bride price and a
forced marriage or death could constitute persecution, the BIA has made similarly surprising errors
in reasoning. Judge Posner, authoring the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Xiu Zhen Lin v. Mukasey,
expressed disbelief at the BIA's apparent finding
that sterilization induced by the inability to pay a
monetary fine would not amount to persecu64 Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036-37
(8th Cir. 2008).
65 Id.at 1037.
66 Id

67 See also Manzur v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
494 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
immigration judge's analysis of the petitioners' economic persecution claims was insufficient to determine
if he had applied the correct legal standard and remanding the case for adjudication under the standard set forth
in T-Z-). Manzur involved a widow from Bangladesh and three of her adult children, who were the
immediate family members of a former high-ranking
military official and a leading freedom fighter. They
were placed under house arrest for a month and subjected to constant surveillance and harassment for the
next twelve years, including the denial of benefits and
medical care, as well as obstruction of employment
opportunities. Id.at 284-85.

tion.68 Citing the language in T-Z- indicating
that a particularly onerous fine can amount to persecution, the court remanded the case to the BIA
to determine "the likely consequences if the petitioner (and her son) are returned to China ...
[including] the size of the monetary penalties they
are likely to impose on the petitioner . .. [and]
whether she is likely to be able to pay them .... 69
Thus, even the BIA has strayed from its own standard for economic persecution.
While the Tenth Circuit has not limited economic claims to those involving a threat to life or
freedom, in Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, it offered
its own narrow interpretation of T-Z-,
finding
that "the Kovac test can support asylum absent a
threat to life or freedom if an alien has suffered a
severe loss of an existing economic/vocational
advantage." 7° Vicente-Elias involved two Quichespeaking individuals of Mayan ancestry who
argued that they suffered economic persecution in
Guatemala, "where Spanish-speakers refuse to
employ native Americans who communicate in
indigenous languages." '7 1 Rejecting VicenteElias's argument that the immigration judge had
applied the wrong legal standard, the court found
that the judge had "clearly applied the Acosta test,"
which the court found to be "consistent with In re
T-Z- under the circumstances ... involving
general economic disadvantage but no seizure or
loss of property, assets, or professional occupation/status that would implicate the Kovac test."72
Since there was no evidence that the life of VicenteElias or his family were "threatened by economic
68

Xiu Zhen Lin v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 596, 597-98
(7th Cir. 2008).
69 Id. at 599; cf Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d
138, 164 & n.25 (2d Cit. 2008) (finding that the Chinese petitioners had failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of economic persecution based on a single
statement in a 2006 Country Report indicating that
women with two or more children are sometimes penalized with a fee that leaves them little practical choice but
to undergo an abortion, and noting that "a system of
economic rewards and moderate economic penalties"
did not necessarily amount to persecution).
70
Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1086, 1089
(10th Cir. 2008).
71 Id. at 1088.
72 Id. at 1090.
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circumstances," or that they "face a potential loss
of freedom through some form of confinement,
enforced servitude, or the like," the court affirmed
73
the finding of no past persecution.
The court's reasoning in Vicente-Elias seems to
stem from the fear of"opening the floodgates" that
Foster describes, rather than proper legal analysis,
as nothing in T-Z- limits "severe economic
deprivation" to situations where the government
takes away an existing asset or employment, rather
than actions or policies preventing someone from
obtaining such assets or employment in the first
place. Thus, while the court purported to apply
it actually parsed the
the standard in T-Z-,
standard in such a way as to require a higher
threshold of harm.
So far, no circuit court has explicitly addressed
whether the standard in T-Z- is valid, but it
may well be challenged in future cases as imposing
a higher standard for economic harm than generally required. In Vicente-Elias, the Tenth Circuit
specifically noted assuming, without deciding,
that the standard in T-Z- is valid. 74 Moreover,
in Kadri v. Mukasey, where the First Circuit
remanded pursuant to T-Z- a case involving a
Muslim Indonesian who could not work as a doctor because of his sexual orientation, the court
noted that it did not need to address whether the
BIA's new standard in T-Z- "survives Chevron
75
review .
Foster's book comes at a critical time, not only
because of increasing acceptance of the connection
between refugee law and human rights law and significant developments in the current understanding of economic and social rights, but also because
more asylum applicants are articulating the aspects
of their claims involving socioeconomic deprivation. All jurisdictions, including the United
States, now recognize that socioeconomic harm
can rise to the level of persecution, but inconsis73 Id. at 1091-92.
74Id. at 1089 n.3.
75Kadriv. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16,22 (lstCir. 2008)

(noting that Kadri "may be able to sustain a claim for
economic persecution"). The majority of the BIA had
disagreed with the immigration judge's finding that
Kadri has suffered past persecution based on economic
deprivation. Id at 21.

tencies and insecurities still obstruct attempts at
coherent analysis. It is hoped that Foster's meticulous research, sober reasoning, and original analysis will encourage further scholarship on these
pressing issues and will lead to a more sophisticated understanding of both the refugee definition
and the substantive content of economic and
social rights. The proper adjudication of socioeconomic claims will likely play a vital role in challenging the lingering, dominant orthodoxy of civil
and political rights, help coalesce the relationship
between human rights and refugee law, and promote the development of refugee law, with some
coherency, as a body of law.
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Confronting Global Terrorism andAmerican Neoconservatism: The Frameworkofa LiberalGrand
Strategy. By Tom Farer. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. x, 257. £50,
cloth; $29.95, £16.50, paper.
It is happening again. A Democratic president
is pilloried by the hawkish right for being inexperienced, soft, and blindly idealistic as regards
national security and foreign policy. This reprise
of our familiar political theater suggests that
Barack Obama's 2008 presidential victory did not
close the book on the "neocons." In fact, the political repudiation of neoconservatism at the ballot
box has never been a guarantee of its decline. After
all, neoconservatives made quite a lot of noise from
the sidelines during the waning years of the Clinton presidency, rattling their sabers ever more
loudly over Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And just as the
political exile ofneoconservatives in the 1990s did
not signal their retreat, their ubiquity in present
policy debates-and the conviction with which
they press their critiques-is proof that neoconservatism is with us still. Neoconservatism's muscular
and righteous vision of America's historic power

